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ABSTRACT
Operational Resea.rch. has contributed substantially to decisions on cost-effective induction of
weapon systems, evaluation of tactical plans, development of computerised war games for training,
realistic formulation of General Staff Qualitative Requirements, performance and reliability evaluation
of military hardware under design and development, force structure planning and other tactical and
strategic issues in Indian defence. This paper reviews the work in Military OR initiated by Professor
DS Kothari, the first Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence, and brings out the role it can
play in defence decision making.
all the more necessary to thoroughly understand the
science and the design parameters underlying the
weapons in order that within the limitation of OUI
resources, we can choose them wisely and produce them
economically. The poorer a country is, the harder is
the thinking it needs to do,"
At the Second Defence Science Conference held
during 21-26 April 1952, Professor Kothari devoted a
considerable part of his addressl to the importance of
OR in 'Defence Science, need of close interaction
between, OR teams a~d the Services, examples of OR
from World War ii and effectiveness of weapons (or
weapon economics as he preferred to call it). He created
a small OR Cell in the Defence Science Laboratory
( now Defence Science Centre) in 1949, The first impetus
to OR came from the CACDS (Commonwealth
Advisory Committee on Defence Science ) conference
organised in March 1953, at New Delhi. Professor
Blackett was invited to this conference which discussed
OR problems pertaining to operations of weapons and
equipment in the Eastern theatre, reliability of airborne
radio equipment, traffic accidents involving army
vehicles, storage and deterioration of rubber goods used
by the armed forces (.nd countermeasures for mines in
the battlefield, This conference provided sufficient
stimulus to the OR activity not only in defence but also
in other sectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The birth of Operational Research can be attributed
to the pioneering work of Professor PMS Blackett, who
along with a team of scientists and engineers, was asked
by the British Government to advise the Royal Air
Force on the problems arising out of induction of new
weapons and equipment during World War II. This
group observed that, in many cases, improvement in a
system could be achieved by merely carrying out a
scientific analysis of its operating policies and identifying
a better policy for system operation. This led to the
birth of Operational Research ( Operations Research as
it was later called in the USA and the countries following
American English).
It is a mere coincidence that Professor Blackett, who
was the main founder of Operational Research (OR),
was called upon to advise the Government of India to
set up the Defence Science Organisation (DSO), which
finally came into existence with Professor DS Kothari
as its first Scientific Adviser, in May 1948. Professor
Kothari was a great visionary who could foresee the
immense potential of the emerging field of OR. The
importance that he attached to OR can be assessed from
his own statement (Professor DS Kothari Memorial
Lecture by A Nagaratnam at Defence Laboratory,
Jodhpur, 6 July 1993): " As resources are limited, it is
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development, reliability evaluation, etc. Owing to the
induction of computers, Services became keen on
acquiring computer war games for their training
purposes and MOD's interest shifted to larger strategic
issues. Some of the important areas in Military OR are
discussed in subsequent sections of this paper .
In 1959, DSO was expanded and reorganised by
merging a number of Service/technical institutions, and
the Defence Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) came into existence. Professor Kothari, in
consultation with Army Headquarters, created the
Weapons Evaluation Group (now Institute for Systems
Studies and Analyses) on 1 June 1959. The Group was
primarily responsible for carrying out OR studies and
analysis of weapons for the three Services. Operational
Research was also undertaken in the Offices of the
Scientific Advisers to the three Services for meeting the
Services' immediate requirements. This could be
considered as the beginning ofMjlitary OR (OR applied
to military problems) and also as a concrete step towards
induction of OR in Defence decision making, which
Professor Kothari emphasised in his speeches to
scientists and Service officers. .A 'System Analysis
Group' for attending to problems of Air Force was
started in 1972, which was later renamed as
Aeronautical Systems Analysis Group. This Group
became the Centre for Aeronautical Systems Studies
and Analyses (CASSA) on 3 October 1984 and was
made responsible for carrying out performance
assessment, evaluation and cost-effectiveness studies
mainly relating to Air Force systems using quantitative
techniques of OR and Systems Analysis.
2. SELECTION AND ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS
In his address on 21 April 1952 at the Second
Defence Science Conference, Professor Kothari stated:
"The problem of evaluation of weapon efficiencies, or
weapon economics for brevity, arises at all levels. One
may ask: Is it an advantage to change from say Rifle
A to Rifle B, and if so what will be the relative advantage
gained? Is it worthwhile, and if so, to what extent, to
replace TNT with RDX in shells?" Similar questions
continued to be asked of Military OR specialists since
the decision makers in Defence were mainly concerned
initially with identifying suitable weapon systems for
acquisition.
This article is dedicated to Professor Kothari, whose
inspiring and thought-provoking lectures and
discussions had a considerable impact on the author ,
who as a young defence scientist,- was trying to
understand the role that OR can play in rational decision
making in defence.
Operational Research is an applied science and is
therefore related to the prevailing environment in the
sector in which it is being applied. Hence, the growth
of Military OR has been related to the needs of
management in the defence sector. Before 1980, when
the Defence Research and Development Organisation
had not embarked upon major weapon development
programmes, the emphasis in the Ministry of Defence
(MOD) was on the selection of weapons and equipment
and in the Services on the evaluation of tactical plans.
In addition there was interest in studying the procedures
and practices in vogue with a view to modifying them
to meet new challenges. Thus system improvement and
modification became an important activity of OR. After
1980, DRDO management was more concerned with
performance evaluation of systems under design and
Initial studies were concerned largely with
evaluation of guns and rockets on the basis of a
, measure of effectiveness (MOE)' and the total cost
of the system to be inducted. Calculation of MOE
required the development of mathematical or
simulation models, e.g. the effectiveness of an artillery
gun measured in terms of the coverage or the proportion
of the area damaged of a specified target during the
mission time. This activity led to a large number of
studies on effectiveness, area coverage and damage
assessment. The determination of system cost involves
the procurement cost, maintenance cost, ammunition
cost, personnel cost, training cost, etc. After
determining the MOE and the total system cost (TSC),
the cost effectiveness ratio of each proposed weapon
system is evaluated by dividing TSC by MOE. The
lowest value of TSC/MOE determines the most
cost-effective weapon and is recommended for
acquisition.
Mer the 1971 war, the paradigm of OR studies in
weapon evaluation shifted to systems rather than
specific weapons, e.g. , anti-tank missiles, ground attack
missiles, suitability of nuclear submarine for the Indian
environment, maritime reconnaissance aircraft,
comparison of heavy guns vs free flight rockets, deep
penetration strike aircraft (DPSA) vs guided missiles,
rockets vs anti-ship missiles, proportional damage to
targets by conventional, prefragmented warheads, etc.
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The cost-effectiveness analysis continued to
dominate the selection and ctcquisition of weapons.
More recent studies concern air defence guns, missiles,
radars, etc. The modelling approach has been more
sophisticated partly due to complications in weapon
systems and partly due to enonnous mathematical and
computational methods available with the analysts. It
may be emphasized thatMilitary OR studies on weapon
evaluation, which were earlier conducted by comparing
a few important characteristics of the weapon, have
been later evaluated with a larger number of variables
in related combat scenarios using analytic models or
simulation. As a result, the studies were more realistic
and helped in enhancing the confidence of the Services
in such studies.
various weapons for defence of some vulnerable areas,
search schemes for an area, etc. A number of tactical
problems such as optimum spacing between ships in a
search and attack unit, optimum aiming strategy for
target coverage, optimum distance to lift artillery
support during an infantry attack, optimum number of
AD guns controlled by a radar, and optimum mix of
AD guns and missiles have been analysed after 1980.
3. EVALUATION OF TACTICAL PLANS
Is the existing deployment of a weapon most
effective in achieving its intended mission? Can the
effectiveness of an operation be improved through
scientific analysis? Can tactical plans be evaluated
without conducting a field exercise? These questions
have been posed to milit~ry operational researchers
since World War II and have been satisfactorily
answered.
The classical example of depth charge in World War
II is one of the earliest of this kind. The initial depth
setting of 100 ft ( = 30.5 m) of the depth charge did not
produce the desired effect in killing enemy submarines
and therefore Professor Blackett and his team were
entrusted with the responsibility ("" iesigning a more
powerful depth charge. While this was being done, a
scientific analysis revealed that if the depth setting is
made 25 ft instead of 100 ft, the number of submarines
killed would increase to two and half times. This finding,
when implemented, improved th~ number of
submarines killed significantly. This study and many
similar studies in World War II brought out clearly the
role that scientific analysis can play in improving
operational effectiveness.
After the 1965 war, the Defence forces became more
concerned about their prevalent operational tactics.
Thus they consulted OR scientists .0 analyse their
plans/scaling norms on the basis of scientific analysis,
e.g., minimum effective scale of anti-aircraft guns
required in a given mission, effective scales of war
wastage reserves, etc. Several important studies were
undertaken in the seventies on deployment patterns of
4. SYSTEM MODIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT
The effectiveness of an organisation or system may
change owing to changes in the operating environment
and may call for new policies to be implemented in
place of the existing ones. Generally these changes are
done on an ad-hoc basis which need not be optimal.
Also, many systems can be improved by using the
capabilities of modem computer systems.
Such modification programmes involve a variety of
tasks such as provisioning, stocking, maintenance of
stores, costing of projects, manpower policy evaluation,
monitoring performance of ordnance factories, and
maintenance of war wastage reserves and spares.
Military OR has also been used in comparing the cost
of indigenous production vs license production vs import
of weapon system and specifying the requirement of
spares over the life cycle of weapon systems being
acquired. Within the scope of logistics management,
OR studies have also been undertaken to improve the
movementlt.ransportation of forces in narrow
mountainous terrains, transshipment of supplies from
base to forward units, positioning of communication
radio sets in order to ensure a sufficient signal strength
for communication in unfavourable terrain, and scales
for authorisation of these equipment to Army .units.
The task of the OR practitioners in this sphere of
activity was not simple. Besides the modelling work,
they were faced with an uphill task of acquiring data,
knowledge about the procedures by actually visiting the
forward areas and later generating the users' confidence
in their solutions which, although scientifically valid,
may not be acceptable to the traditionalists. It is only
by gradual interaction and persuasion, the users'
confidence was won to accept recommendations arising
out of these studies.
Development of cheaper, inexpensive computer
systems has added another dimension. Many problems
which were earlier tackled in a routine manner by
mechanical means have been improved by using the
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computer capabilities of PCs and work stations. Such
studies include stores management, database
management, mission planning studies, ship navigation
studies, map digitization, etc. , where the main emphasis
is not on mathematical modelling but on the use of
computers as an aid to systematize and improve the
existing procedures.
s. DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPON
SYSTEMS
In order to assess the hit probability one needs to
study the type of errors. These errors can be studied
for eac~ subsystem and their reasonable limits assessed.
For example, for a static tank firing on the static target,
the errors such as those of sensors for giving inputs to
the ballistic computer of the gun control system, errors
of the ballistic computer itself, gun laying errors and
the ammunition errors are important in affecting the
hit probability. The hit probability can then be evaluated
analytically or through simulation by superimposing the
errors appropriately.
The hit probabilities in the three cases mentioned
above can thus be evaluated without carrying out field
trials. If there is a mismatch in the estimated hit
probabilities for static-static, static-moving and
moving-moving cases against figures defined in GSQRs,
the same can be identified and resolved in consultation
with the users.
The design and development activity of the weapons
in the MOD is initiated by tbe Services by defining.the
General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs)
which specify the operational characteristics that the
users (Services) desire to have in the proposed weapon
system. The work in a large ~ystem is usually divided
into subsystems and f'",.h of these may need the help
'of other R&D agencies, universities and other public
and private organisations depending upon the
capabilities/facilities available with them. Thus,
hardware development invariably requires a great deal
of coordinated effort calling for the use of project
management techniques like PERT/CPM and
appropriate technical reviews at different levels.
Besides project management, the following are some
of the areas in which Military OR has been helpful:
(a) Removing disparities in GSQRs,
(b) Performance evaluation of systems, and
(c) Reliability evaluation.
5.2 Performance Evaluation of Systems
A weapon system can be subjected to simulation to
evaluate its performance much before it has been
completely designed and developed. Such analysis helps
in identifying alternative designs of the weapon system
for its optimal performance. Consider a situation in
which the project manager wishes to determine the
survivability of the tank and study the trade-off between
the weight and the survivability of the tank.
The probability of kill by an anti-tank weapon for
a given hit depends upon its penetration capability,
which in turn depends on the thickness of the plates,
the angle of attack as well as the nature of the armour .
Thus, for different plate thicknesses and their
inclination, one can evaluate the kill probability and
consequently the survivability of the tank, and also the
weight of the tank, even before the tank prototypes
have been fabricated. This approach can thus be helpful
in deciding design issues without actually developing
the prototypes, and will obviously save the time and
cost of development. Computer helps in this process
very effectively since one may use Computer-Aided
Design (CAD) packages to depict the
weapon/equipment on the computer terminal and study
various design ideas even at the conceptual stage .
5.1 Removing Disparities in GSQRs
As discussed above, GSQRs define the
characteristics that the system/subsystem should have
in order to meet the users' requirements. While a great
deal of care is taken in defining these characteristics,
some ambiguities may arise because the users'
requirements are generally based upon the best
performance characteristics available in similar systems
elsewhere. In this process, it is possible that certain
QRs (qualitative requirements) can be met; while others
may be too difficult to achieve at the current state of
technological development. As an example, consider
the QRs of a tank gun specifying the first round hit
probability under different operational conditions, e.g.,
a static tank firing on a static target (tank), static tank
firing on a moving target and a moving tank firing on
a moving target.
5.3 Reliability Evaluation
Weapon systems have to operate under varying
environmental conditions and have, therefore, to meet
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stringent reliability requirements. Such requirements
can be met by enforcing the reliability concept from the
initial stages of equipment design. The apportionment
of reliability to various subsystems, prediction of
reliability from fault tree analysis for alternative designs
and estimation of reliability of various subsystems based
on laboratory/field trial data help in cutting down the
cost of development as well as in ensuring the desired
reliability of the system in actual operations. There has
been a significant contribution by OR practitioners in
reliability evaluation of missiles, communication
systems, radars, torpedoes and several electronic
systems.
6. mREA T ASSF$SMENT AND STRATEGIC
PLANNING
Long-term identification of threat on our borders
and measures to counteract them on a timely basis
constitute the most important decision-making problem
particularly to executives in MOD and Service
Headquarters. This needs an evaluation of the force
strength/potential of a country and its adversaries
quantitatively to assist in answering the following types
of questions: If country A has acquired certain
technological capability either indigeno.JJsly or through
procurement, what should country B do so as to have
a cost-effective alternative to meet the enhanced
capabilities of A ? If a war breaks out, what is the chance
of country A winning under different scenarios? If two
countries have come to some settlement on their
boundary dispute, what should be done as a confidence
building measure by a country by pulling back some of
its forces from border so that both countries can live
peacefully, but at the same time be in a position to meet
any aggression by the other country if it betrays the
settled agreement.
All these questions have been tackled by Military
OR analysts and several techniques like Quantified
Judgeml.nt Method of Analysis2.3 and WEI/WUV
method using Analytic Hierarchy Process4, have been
used to answer specific queries by the top management
of the MOD/DRDO/Service Headquarters. This area
has been progressively developed in India and the users.
confidence is well reflected by an increasing number of
studies which are now being tackled by Military OR
analysts.
available resources effectively is an important activity
in defence. For this purpose, military field exercises are
conducted regularly. The large military field exercises
(such as 'Brassta.cks' conducted by India in 1987 in the
Rajasthan sector or 'Zarb-e-Momin' conducted by
Pakistan in December 1989 in the Indus-Jhelum-Chenab
corridor) are very expensive and time consuming.
However, these are necessary in order to re-evaluate
and ascertain the effectiveness of the existing manpower
and weapon systems in a conflict scenario. The Chief
of the Army Staff of Pakistan, during the military
exercise 'Zarb-e-Momin', observed that many of his
Generals and Brigadiers did not have the requisite
experience of war, because most of them were very
young during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. There
has been no war since then, and the technology and
war scenarios have changed considerably thereafter .
Some important alternatives for military training are
map exercises, telephone battles, sand model exercises
and computer war games. Comparatively, these are
easier to conduct and have a relatively higher degree
of abstraction than military field exercises.
In India, a study team under the former Chief of
the Army Stat; General K Sundarji (then Lt General
and Commandant, College of Combat, Mhow) took up
the task of creating a computer-assisted war game for
a Brigade level at the College of Combat, Mhow, in
collaboration with Military College of
Telecommunication Engineering, Mhow, in May 1980.
This team used the Quantified Judgement Method of
Analysis (QJMA). The team found QJMA useful for
war games at Brigade/Divlsiori/Corps levels, but not for
games at lower levels like regiment. The computerised
war games were initially developed to meet this
objective, i.e. , development of war games at regiment
level.
The structure chart of a regiment level war game
for tank-to-tank battle is shown in Fig. 1 (see Jaiswal
and Jethi5). The game has been designed to be played
in three rooms called Blue Room (friendly force), Red
Room (enemy force) and Umpire Room (also called
Higher Command or HICON). The Umpire or HICON
presents a scenario defining the background and the
objective of the game, area, terrain and environmental
conditions during game play and availability of weappns
and resources on both sides. The Blue and Red teams
are asked to prepare their plans and forward them to
the Umpire. The Umpire executes the plans under given
7. WAR GAMES
Training of Service officers to appreciate a threat
situation and plan for remedial measures within the
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rules6.7. Though these combat studies have remained
largely theoretical, practical applications of the theory
are being attempted for development of large-scale war
games..
The philosophy of developing air and naval war
games is similar to what has been explained above for
the land war games. These computer war games are
being usefully played in training establishments of the
Services.
8. OR AND COMPUTER INTERFACE
OR was initially defined as 'quantitative common
sense' since the problems tackled were very simple, and
the answers arrived through scientific analysis looked
as if these could have been obtained using common
sense. However, the term 'quantitative' is significant
and brings out the real focus of an OR analysis. With
larger managerial problems, the analysts had to invent
newer tools and techniques and use them to undertake
more complicated studies. The developments in
computer systems provided support to such studies and
also to the development of algorithms to handle large
problems.
Figure I. Structure chart or a regiment level computerised war
game.
rules and provides casualties of personnel and
equipment. A revised game status is obtained and is
made available appropriately to the Blue and Red sides
who are permitted to revise their action plans. The game
continues till the termination conditions are satisfied.
The three rooms (Blue, Red and Umpire) are
equipped with workstations/PC-A Ts which are
connected through a Local Area Network (LAN). A
database of weapon characteristics is created which
contains details such as detection, hit and kill
probabilities as functions of range and environmental
factors. Using digital cartography the realistic features
of a map including terrain can be brought into the game
play. Extensive combat rules are incorporated to
simulate actual battle drills followed by the two sides.
The combat rules also include attrition rules for which
combat/attrition models are developed to assess
casualties in specific encounters, replacing the gut
judgement of the Umpire in sand models/map exercises.
The early models on attrition were largely based on
Lanchester equations which have some limitations.
These limitations have been eliminated by including
spatial effects, reserve planning and battle termination
8.1 MIS, DSS and Expert Systems
The concept of Management Information System
(MIS) was an important development in providing
executives with information in desired formats.
However, MIS did not provide any decision-making
capability and an interface of MIS with OR models
through a dialogue module, called r>ecision Support
System (DSS) was developed in early 1970s. A decision
support system is an interactive system that provides
the user with access to decision mo.dels and data in
order to support semi-structured tasks8. Another
significant interface arose in terms of Expert Systems
which are defined as follows: A computer program that
exhibits, within a specific domain, a degree of expertise
in problem solving that is comparable to that of a human
expert. Both DSSs and Expert Systems have enriched
the interface of OR and computer science significantly.
8.2 Role or Personal Computers in OR
The most significant impact on OR came with the
advent of personal computers (PCs). The following~
advantages in OR implementation resulted from the
introduction of PCs:
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techniques include tabu search1O, neural networks11,
target analysis11 and genetic algorithmsl2. These need
to be used/developed further for applications in Indian
defence.
(a)
{b)
Machine Independent Transportability : Software
developed on mainframe computers were
dependent on the specific machine. The
development of software on PCs and its
transportability through floppies has provided the
OR analyst with the facility to demonstrate the
results on a PC in the room of the executive, thus
enhancing communication between the analyst and
the decision maker significantly.
Interactive Computing: Another capability on
PCs is the ease with which the data and even
assumptions can be interactively modified. This
helps the decision maker to validate the model
from his experience, and. improves mutual
understanding with the analyst.
Graphics Capability : The availability of graphics
on PCs helps the analyst in explaining and
convincing the decision maker about the results of
his study. A graphical presentation is obviously
more acceptable to the manager for appreciating
the results of a study.
(c)
9. FUTURE OF Mn.IT ARY OR
Advances in OR and computer science and their
interface are bringing in new developments in scientific
decision making. A more recent concept is Visual
Interactive Modelling13 in which OR models and
MIS/Grappics are interfaced through interactive
algorithms. A visual interactive model helps in
increasing the mutual understanding between the
analyst and the executive by providing a dynamic
animated view of the model.
Military OR has been applied to many vital issues
such as the complex problem of scheduling the airlift
of 3,50,000 troops and hundreds of thousands of tonnes
of cargo in more, than 11,500 missions before and during
the Gulf Warl4, military stability in a multi-polar
worldl5, effect of command, control and communication
on combat dynamicsl6, etc. (For additional applications
of OR to Gulf War, see Schuppe17 and Roehrkasse &
GeorgeI8).
8.3 Computationally Efficient Algorithms
One more important advantage of computers came
up when the size of an OR problem became sufficiently
large. The requirement in such cases is to develop
computationally efficient algorithms which take lesser
time so that the managers can get answers to their
complex decision-making problems in a reasonable
time.
A large number of decision-making problems are
optimisation problems in which the analyst has to
maximise or minimise an objective function. Owing to
the complex interdependencies between its variables,
an optimisation problem may not be amenable to
classical OR techniques like Linear Programming or
Dynamic Programming, or may require enormous
computer time to arrive at the results. For solving such
problems, heuristic optimisation techniques grew
predominantly in the eighties. These are random search
procedures in the feasible solution space. They have
the advantage of tackling problems more easily and at
reduced computation time. However, the results
obtained from heuristic techniques are approximate or
near-optimal. Very large scale problems, e.g., Weapon
Targeting Problem9, involving a number of weapons,
targets and sites have been solved using Simulated
Annealing technique. Other heuristic optimisation
It seems that considerable potential exists for using
Military OR in our own context than what has been
done so far. Presumably, greater understanding
between the Military OR analysts and the users and an
environment for mutual interaction has to be created
in order ~o boost the profession of Military OR.
Military OR will be more in demand in future owing
to the need for quick and rational decision making.
There have not been any serious compulsi.ons in our
context but with increasing competition, constraints,
uncertainties and global dependencies to affect decision
making, there will be a greater need to involve an
interdisciplinary team of analysts including Military OR
experts and computer scientists. The need for bringing
in cost-effectiveness in our decision making,
ttuantification in place of qualitative appreciation, and
better interaction between analysts and management
through the growth of computer technology is being
appreciated. It is a real challenge to Military OR
analysts and computer professionals to provide defence
executives with rationaJ cost-effectivesolutions and to
present their analysis in a format which defence
executives can appreciate.
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7
8
9.
10,
Earning users' confidence is still an important task
for the OR profession. There is still resistance to
accepting the results of scientific analysis: OR
practitioners should therefore concentrate on
behavioural aspects also in order to evolve a steady
support from the initial stages of a study when they
interact with the users for problem definition, data
collection and analysis, and finally for implementation
of the study. Perhaps, a stiff attitude on pure
optimisation may not be helpful and one may have to
look for 'satisficing' solutions rather than 'optimising'
solutions.
The best tribute that one; can pay to Professor
Kothari ' s dream of using O R in defence decision making
is to create an environment conducive to OR
development that will not only make India militarily
strong but also save enough t:Tloney and resources
without jeopardising national security.
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